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MENTAL PRIVACY: AN INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARD TO GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSIONS
INTO THE MENTAL PROCESSES
The mind is the heart of liberty, its last stronghold. It is be-
cause that stronghold is hidden and beyond the reach of any
dictation that liberty grows irresistibly in strength.'
In spite of the various United Nations provisions concerning
the personal integrity of individuals, no state is expressly pre-
cluded from altering the mental processes of its nationals.2 This
comment will reveal examples of human modification techniques
that are being utilized by governments as instruments to repress
dissidence. In this regard, attention will be focused on political
dissidents in the Soviet Union and incarcerated deviants in the
United States.
Certain United Nations documents demonstrate that this
organization does not condone such state practices.3  Because
of the potential abuse of such state intrusions, adoption of an in-
ternational right to privacy will be urged. Such a right would im-
pose an express prohibition upon states, requiring them to abstain
from intervention into the thought processes of their nationals for
1. J. CARY, POWER IN MEN 18 (1963) [hereinafter cited as POWER IN
MEN].
2. McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The
Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L. J. 901 (1974).
Individuals are said to be the "nationals" of a state when that state as-
serts, and the larger world community honors, claims to protect and con-
trol such individuals for all the comprehensive purposes of states, as
contrasted with occasional particular exercises of competence under
varying principles of jurisdiction.
Id.
3. Although the United Nations has enacted provisions which relate to hu-
man rights, a state's legal obligation with respect to domestic behavior affecting
the rights of its nationals is not clear. This situation seems to exist because the
specific content of the state's obligation, the prescribed and prohibited state be-
havior, and the individual human rights protected need further elaboration through
interpretation. See Schluter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses
of the United Nations Charter, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 110, 127 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Schluter].
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social or political purposes. Having proposed this right, a vehicle
will be recommended by which the United Nations can safeguard it.
I. INTRUSIONS INTO THE MENTAL
PROCESSES FOR POLITICAL REASONS
The constitution of the Soviet Union guarantees to Soviet
citizens not only freedom of speech, but the material requisites
necessary for the exercise of that right.4 Another provision of
the Soviet constitution guarantees "inviolability of the person," 5
which in theory protects the individual against indiscriminate in-
carceration.
Despite these constitutional guarantees, there are thousands of
political psychiatric cases in the Soviet Union.6  Virtually any So-
viet citizen who undergoes a psychiatric examination may find
himself pronounced neurotic or psychotic on the flimsiest of
grounds.
It must be borne in mind that alongside a forensic psychiatric
system dominated by the KGB, there is a much larger system of
ethically run and well organized clinics which are staffed by psy-
chiatrists who abhor such psychiatric practices." Yet the power
of the KGB is so pervasive that the opportunity is great for creat-
ing new syndromes to incriminate political dissidents.' Some psy-
4. Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution provides:
In conformity with the interests of working people, and in order to
strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaran-
teed by law:
(a) freedom of speech .... These civil rights are ensured by placing
at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing
presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communication fa-
cilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SoviET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS art. 125 (1936).
5. Id. Article 127 of the Soviet Constitution provides: "Citizens of the
U.S.S.R. are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person shall be placed
under arrest except by decision of a court of law or with the sanction of a pro-
curator."
6. THE ECONOMIST, July 8, 1972, at 41 [hereinafter cited as Tim ECONO-
MIST]. For a few examples of such cases, see Hearing Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal
Security Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 136 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
7. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 6, at 41.
8. Id. The initials KGB stand for Komitet Gossudarrst-vennoi Bezopast-
nosti (Committee of State Security; Soviet Secret Police). R. DESOLA, ABBREVIA-
TIONS DICTIONARY 151 (3d ed. 1967).
9. Two main types of psychiatric repression are employed in the Soviet
Union. One type, compulsory psychiatric treatment, is ordered by the courts for
1975
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1975], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss1/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
chiatric reports in Russia have included as symptoms of mental
illness:
[P]ersistent mania for truth-seeking, [wearing] a beard,
meticulousness of thought and insufficient insight with regard
to the existing situation . . pathologic development of per-
sonality combined with a zeal for reform, inclination to fruit-
less philosophizing, pretentiousness and inclination toward
scriptomania .... 10
These psychiatric symptoms seem to be the products of the
value judgments of unscrupulous Soviet psychiatrists." The use
persons having been accused of crimes and declared insane by forensic psychiatric
commissions. The second type is an order by a psychiatrist who occupies an ad-
ministrative position and has the effect of forcibly hospitalizing that person.
1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 6. Once a person has been found in need of
compulsory psychiatric treatment his imprisonment can only be terminated by a
court of justice. 1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 7. The court of justice may
release a person if it finds that incarceration was wrongful or if a medical commis-
sion determines that the person has recovered his sanity.
In practice, a favorable determination by the commission usually de-
pends on the readiness of the patient to give desired answers to certain
questions, namely, recognition of the correctness of the patient's confine-
ment, admission that his views were wrong, and the promise to conform
with the established ideology in the future. It is evident that for persons
free of any guilt, such admissions often are impossible on a moral basis.
In such cases, compulsory treatment may continue indefinitely, even to
the end of the patient's life. Soviet legislation provides no limit for com-
pulsory treatment.
1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 7.
10. Id. at 26.
11. It is the absence of accurate diagnostic criteria and the lack of sufficient
information on the clinical limits of psychic disturbances that motivated a special
committee of experts from the World Health Organization (WHO) to recommend
the following definition of mental illness as:
A pronounced disturbance in psychic activity, sufficiently specific in
character that it can always be recognized and identified with a typical
set of symptoms and sufficiently serious to produce a loss in the ability
to work, or to incapacitate the person in a way as to require prolonged
absence from work or require specific legal or other social action.
1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 25.
By utilizing one's political outlook as a symptom of mental illness, a critic
of a social system can easily be made to appear mentally deranged. See e.g.,
1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 136. In one case, a Soviet critic was pro-
nounced to be suffering from schizophrenia after being tried without having
appeared in court. The court determined that "the basis of his schizoid per-
sonality stemmed from his 'reform delirium.' " 1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at
135.
The occurrences of certain political events can bring about the release of cer-
tain political prisoners. For example, after the fall of Khruschev, political pris-
oners who had been incarcerated for criticizing a political decision which Khrus-
chev's successors condemned, were deemed "healthy" and released. 1972 Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 137.
In the United States, the White House Plumbers in 1971 engaged in the at-
Vol. 6
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of such syndromes as indicators of mental illness provides the So-
viet government with an excuse for ridding itself of individuals
who espouse unacceptable ideas . 2  By labeling as pathological
the value judgments or political opinions that an individual advo-
cates, psychiatrists coerce those expressing political views different
from or at odds with the Soviet government to adopt a "correct
point of view."' 3
Such practices result in the governmental suppression of dis-
sent in a manner that stifles contrary political views and maintains
the status quo. Moreover, whether an individual released from
a mental institution remains free in many instances depends upon
his ability to refrain from disseminating anti-Soviet views. 14  The
Russian practice of confining political prisoners in mental hospi-
tals and treating them as mentally ill is increasing.'5 Once incar-
cerated, prisoners are often subjected to chemical treatment which
causes atrophy of the brain.' 6
This arbitrary intrusion into the minds of Soviet citizens
seems to be done for the sole purpose of advancing political and
tempted repression of political views which they deemed to be against national
interests when they requested CIA doctors to construct a psychiatric profile of
Daniel Ellsberg. This profile was prepared without the psychiatrists ever having
met Ellsberg. They simply pieced together news clippings and F.B.I. and other
governmental reports on Ellsberg. Such profiles are often called "psychohis-
tories." Supporters of psychohistories say that secondhand material can some-
times reveal more about a person than his own words when he knows he is under
analysis. Because the first profile portrayed Ellsberg in a reasonably favorable
manner, the White House Plumbers judged it unsatisfactory and asked for another
report. Apparently, the intent of the government was to use these negative psy-
chiatric reports to portray Ellsberg as being mentally unsound and to thus dis-
credit him and his political message in the eyes of the public. See TIME, Aug.
12, 1974, at 41.
12. One patient in a Soviet psychiatric institution when being informed of
the nature of his illness was told:
Your release depends entirely on your behavior. And, your behavior,
to us, means your political views. In all other respects your behavior
is perfectly normal. Your illness consists of your dissenting opinions.
As soon as you renounce them and adopt a correct point of view, we
will let you go.
1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 136.
13. Id.
14. See generally 1972 Hearings, supra note 6; THE ECONOMIST, supra note
6, at 41.
15. Dr. Norman Hirt, an associate professor of psychiatry at the University
of British Columbia in Vancouver has stated that "conditions [in the Soviet
Union] have gotten worse since he testified in 1972 that 7,000 to 8,000 Soviet
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ideological ends of those in power."' Evidently, political dissi-
dents are not constitutionally protected from such feigned medical
procedures. Instead, they are subjected to medical "treatment"
which has as its end "social control."'I s
II. DESTRUCTION OF PARTS OF THE
MENTALITY FOR SOCIAL PURPOSES
Medical techniques in the United States which intrude into
the mental processes of the individual are different from those be-
ing used in the U.S.S.R. Rather than purposely destroying the
individual's intellect with chemical substances, the principle
threat to a person's mental integrity in the United States is psycho-
surgery."9
Psychosurgery is a pacifying operation which blunts the emo-
tions and subdues behavior regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of any brain disease or any particular psychiatric prob-
lem. It is simply a mutilating operation whose effect is to
destroy the individual's ability to respond emotionally. 20
17. See generally NEWSWEEK, Jan. 7, 1974, at 36.
18. See generally 1972 Hearings, note 6, supra.
19. Psychosurgery did not cease with the advent of psychotherapeutic drugs.
By conservative estimates, at least forty neurosurgeons and psychiatrists in the
U.S. today perform more than 600 procedures per year. Moreover, the results
of a survey indicate that psychosurgeons anticipate a second wave of psychosur-
gery, at least equal to the first surge, which involved a total of 50,000 patients
in the U.S. alone. Breggin, Lobotomies Are Still Bad Medicine, MEDICAL OPIN-
ION, March, 1972, at 32 [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL OPINION].
It is interesting to note that in 1951, the Soviet Union made lobotomies ille-
gal. Id.
20. Hearings on S. 974, S. 878 and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 439 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. See also Symposium: Psy-
chosurgery, 54 BOSTON U.L. REV. 215 (1974). For a collection of representative
definitions, see Annas & Glantz, Psychosurgery: The Law's Response, 54 BOSTON
U.L. REV. 249 n.4 (1974).
The purpose of psychosurgery in the prison system is to modify conduct or
eradicate deviance in the prisoner. It has been stated that the term psychosurgery
is limited to operations on "healthy" brain tissue. Operations on epileptic or dam-
aged brains are considered to be within the general classification of neurosurgery.
Operations on "healthy" brain tissues may cover situations where the making of
a lesion on tlhe brain is to control the pain of a terminal cancer patient. See
Neville, Pots and Black Kettles: A Philosopher's Perspective on Psychosurgery,
54 BOSTON U.L. REV. 340, 346 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Neville].
The term psychosurgery refers to a variety of operative procedures which
attempt to modify patient behavior by surgical techniques. . . . Psycho-
surgery has been used to modify such diverse behavior as homosexuality,
frigidity, hyperactivity, schizophrenia, acute depression, criminal activity,
compulsive gambling, alcoholism, and drug addiction.
Vol. 6
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Psychosurgery makes changes in the brain which are qualita-
tive as well as quantitative." The quantitative change is brought
about by removal of part of the brain. The qualitative changes
are made evident by psychological studies of patients who have
undergone psychosurgery. These studies demonstrate that psy-
chosurgery does not markedly affect the individual's intelligence
quotient. Instead, it produces a shift from abstract to concrete
attitude and adversely affects the subject's planning capacity and
his ability to maintain prolonged attention.22 The reason that psy-
chosurgery does not change an individual's intelligence quotient
is that psychosurgeons can control the general outcome of the
operation by varying the location of the incision. The lower the
cut on the brain, the more the impairment on its emotional parts,
and the higher the cut, the more the intellectual impairment.23
Even if the loss is only partial, there is still a change in the "es-
sence of the person"24 because the thought process of the individ-
ual is altered.
25
The most controversial use of psychosurgery is the destruc-
tion of brain cells that are believed to be sources of aggression in
Comment, Constitutional Law-An Involuntarily Detained Mental Patient's In-
formed Consent is Invalid for Experimental Psychosurgery, 50 CHI. KENT L. REV.
526, 527 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Patient's Informed Consent].
21. See Robinson, Freeman & Watts, Personality Changes After Psycho-
surgery, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON PSYCHOSURGERY
159 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 16) [hereinafter cited as Public Health
Service].
22. Id.
23. MEDICAL OPINION, note 19, supra.
24. If life is to have any moral meaning, man must be treated as if he
has free will. The problems of life can then often be examined and un-
derstood as reflecting the anxiety generated by free will, the agony of
choice, the despair of failure to choose and to act. What is man without
this capacity?
The possession of this capacity is the essence of man which psychosurgery
changes. Breggin, The Second Wave, MENTAL HYGIENE, March, 1973, at 13
[hereinafter cited as MENTAL HYGIENE].
25. The individual seems to lose contact with his "self". There are test re-
sults which lend support to the notion that:
[Pisychosurgery prevents the development of strong tensions regarding
self (a development which makes for maladjustment sometimes but also
for depth and growth of personality) through reducing the individual's
awareness of self-continuity, which thus appears to be mediated by the
frontal lobes and their connections.
Thus the individual seems to lose consciousness of the self. However, "an over-
developed awareness of self-continuity may underlie mental illness; some degree
of it is essential for successful psychotherapy." See Public Health Service, supra
note 21, at 159-60.
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certain "uncontrollable persons." '26 The concept "uncontrollable"
or "dangerous" is equivocal and demonstrates the tremendous
power resting with prison officials, neurosurgeons, or behavioral
therapists,27 who alone may decide whether psychosurgery is to
be performed on inmates.2"
Since it has been noted that psychiatrists make mistakes
when predicting which persons will continue to demonstrate anti-
social conduct,29 psychiatric recommendations for psychosurgical
treatment are questionable." One study surveying all published
literature on the prediction of anti-social conduct revealed that
psychiatrists were particularly prone to commit the error of over-
26. Recent approaches to psychosurgery have focused on the limbic
system, which is part of the cerebrum adjacent to and connecting with
the brain stem. Some leading proponents of psychosurgery for behav-
ioral control contend that violent behavior is initiated in the brain stem
but that the limbic system contains the mechanisms for controlling vio-
lence. Nevertheless, knowledge about the functions of the limbic is con-
sidered inadequate, and even advocates of psychosurgery admit that there
is a disturbing inconsistency in the findings ...
Spoonhour, Psychosurgery and Informed Consent, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 432, 434
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Spoonhour].
27. Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse
"Rehabilitation", 61 VA. L. REV. 155, 174 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gobert].
The lack of standards governing psychosurgical operations has stirred Con-
gress to propose legislation that would affect the government's involvement with
psychosurgical procedures. The following three measures relate directly to the
subject psychosurgery: Senate Bill 878 would preclude the appropriation of fed-
eral funds for human research programs unless, among other things, the informed
consent of the subject is obtained by adequate methods. Senate Joint Resolution
86 called for a two year moratorium on the expenditure of federal funds on
projects that relate to psychosurgery. H.R. 6852 would preclude federal funds
from being given to certain federally connected institutions which failed to make
the performance of psychosurgery an unlawful practice. Thus far, this bill has
not come up for a vote on the floor of the House of Representatives. There were
hearings held on S.J. Res. 86 and S. 878 on June 29, 1973. However, the hear-
ings did not result in Congress enacting the legislation. See generally 1973 Hear-
ings, note 20, supra. See also Congress Weighs 2 Measures, 225 J. AM. M. ASS'N
1044 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Congress Weighs 2 Measures].
28. Gobert, note 27, supra; cf. Hirschkipt & Milleman, The Unconstitution-
ality of Prison Life, PRISONS, PROTEST AND POLmcs 87 (1972).
29. Despite the possible existence of certain premonitory signs and symp-
toms that can be used to predict violence, a major obstacle to the use of such
signs is the prevalence of similar signs and symptoms in people who never commit
a violent act. See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Diamond].
30. For an article discussing a psychiatrist's difficulties in predicting an in-
mate's dangerousness to others, see Diamond, note 29, supra. See also Ericson,
Psychiatrists in Prison: On Admitting Professional Tinkers into a Tinkers' Para-
dise, 22 CITry's L. J. 29 (1974).
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prediction.3 Only a few of the inmates whom psychiatrists pre-
dict to be violent actually engage in such conduct if released.' 2
It must be borne in mind that these so-called "uncontroll-
able persons" are, at the outset, incarcerated because they have de-
viated from a social norm. Since social norms and crimes are phe-
nomena of social and political definitions, they cannot be dealt
with exclusive of moral judgments." Merely labeling an indi-
vidual as a social deviant does not seem to warrant or justify psy-
chosurgery. 4
[P]sychosurgical operations are best compared to the . . .
ancient practices of cutting off a limb or poking out the eyes
of accused criminals. That doctors do the mutilating should
not distract us from the function it serves-impairment of
the individual to control his behavior. 35
As a general rule in the United States, a person is not sub-
jected to psychosurgery without giving his consent .' The key-
31. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process, "A Knife that Cuts Both
Ways", 51 JUDICATURE 370, 376 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz].
32. Id. at 377.
33. It seems to be an individual's deviance from a social value or a codified
social norm which causes the person to be a potential subject for psychosurgery.
Deviance is primarily an issue of sociology and politics because it is created by
social groups. "[D]eviance is not a quality of the act the person commits but
rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an
'offender.'" H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 9 (1963).
In addition to recognizing that deviance is created by the responses of
people to particular kinds of behavior, by the labelling of that behavior
as deviant, we must also keep in mind that the rules created and main-
tained by such labelling are not universally agreed to.
Id. at 18.
The social and political dangers of psychosurgery as a "cure" for social and
political problems is made evident by the fact that some psychosurgeons have re-
cently received grants of over $600,000 from the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to do research
into their theories that brain abnormalities, rather than slum conditions may be
the reason for violence during ghetto riots. See Shawcross, Creating a Clockwork
Orange, NEW STATESMAN, Mar. 30, 1973, at 452 [hereinafter cited as Shawcross].
34. See generally MEDICAL OPINION, note 19, supra. The classification or
categorization of a person as a candidate seems to be made in absence of ade-
quate guidelines. One psychiatrist has stated:
I think they ought to define the conditions for which they operate with
greater specificity. What is aggressive behavior? Who the hell knows?
In the loosest sense we are all behavior problems, and we all require
protections from our aggression in one situation or another.
1973 Hearings, supra note 20, at 379. For congressional reaction to this problem
see Congress Weighs 2 Measures, note 27, supra.
35. See MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 24, at 13.
36. A physician has a duty to reveal to the patient adequate information so
that the patient is able to make an intelligent choice. This duty to disclose
8
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stone of any legal intrusion upon the body of a person is full, ade-
quate and informed consent. To be legally adequate, a subject's
informed consent must be competent, knowing and voluntary.3 7
Only one court has directly addressed the issue of consent
as it relates to psychosurgical procedures. In Kaimowitz v. Dept.
Mental Health, 8 a Michigan trial court held that involuntarily de-
tained mental patients could not give informed and adequate con-
sent to experimental psychosurgical procedures on the brain.
The court stated that:
[I]ntrusion into one's intellect, when one is involuntarily de-
tained and subject to the control of institutional authorities, is
an intrusion into one's constitutionally protected right to pri-
vacy. If one is not protected in his thoughts, behavior, per-
sonality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes mean-
ingless. 39
is imposed on a physician when a given medical procedure involves a known risk
of serious bodily harm. The medical doctor is required to disclose all the material
risks involved and also to explain in lay terms the complications that might pos-
sibly occur. All potential perils must be divulged that are material to the patient's
decision. Cf. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1
(1972); Getchell v. Mansfield, 269 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).
There seems to be considerable difficulty in obtaining the uncoerced consent
of an involuntarily detained inmate. See Kaimowitz v. Dep't Mental Health, Civ.
Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), in 42
U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973). See also MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 24, at
13, wherein Dr. Breggin discusses the difficulty of obtaining a voluntary consent
of an involuntarily detained inmate. Dr. Breggin states that the "consent form
in the psychosurgical unit of the California prison explicitly stated that the pris-
oner would be released from solitary confinement in return for his 'consent' to
treatment." For an example of the consent form signed by one psychosurgery
candidate, see Spoonhour, supra note 26, at 443 n.67. See generally Patient's In-
formed Consent, note 20, supra.
37. See generally Spoonhour, note 26, supra.
38. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10,
1973), in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973).
39. 42 U.S.L.W. 2063-2064 (July 31, 1973). Kaimowitz, the attorney for
Louis Smith, in obtaining an injunction to prevent psychosurgery, argued that:
[O]ffered a choice between indefinite and perhaps lifelong confinement
in a place without treatment and brain surgery, which might do damage
and certainly has a permanent albeit somewhat unknown, effect but af-
fords the only way out, people like Louis Smith might very well choose
the latter.
The patient, Louis Smith, had been placed in a mental hospital at the age of sev-
enteen by his parents. They were unable to control "the tantrums and unbecom-
ing sexual interest" which he displayed. Shawcross, supra note 33, at 452. While
in the mental hospital he raped and then strangled a nurse. He was subsequently
examined by three psychiatrists and declared to be a criminal sexual psychopath.
Under Michigan state law he was given an indefinite sentence to a maximum se-
curity hospital. Smith's release from this institution depended upon his ability to
prove that he was no longer a danger to society.
Vol. 6
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Another court has recognized that the Constitution may pro-
tect the mental processes of an individual. In Mackey v. Procun-
ier,4 ° the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that tinker-
ing with the mental processes raises serious constitutional ques-
tions. Although the court in Mackey did not declare to which
constitutional right it was alluding, it did indicate that affirmative
constitutional action might be in order to protect the mental pro-
cesses of an inmate.
The court in Mackey ruled that forcible injection of an ex-
perimental drug into a prisoner for the purpose of modifying crim-
inal behavior may be impermissible." Because psychosurgery is at
least as intrusive as the treatment involved in Mackey, it seems
that psychosurgery, a fortiori, falls within the constitutionally pro-
tected area referred to in Mackey. 2
After being institutionalized for a number of years, his behavior had been
free of aggression and his violent tendencies seemed to be under control. Despite
this fact, neither he nor his parents believed the hospital would ever pronounce
him cured and allow him to leave. When Smith was given an opportunity, sev-
enteen years after his incarceration, to become a subject in a project studying the
effects of psychosurgery on aggressive tendencies, he accepted. See Shawcross,
supra note 33, at 452. See also Spoonhour, supra note 26, at 443. The author
states there that the testimony in the Kaimowitz trial revealed that Smith would
have been considered for release within six months to a year and that Smith was
probably treatable by more conventional forms of therapy.
40. 477 F.2d 877 (1973). In this case a state prisoner's complaint alleged
that at a state medical facility, he had received a fright drug without consent. The
prisoner consented to undergo shock treatment but not to having the drug succiny-
choline administered. This drug causes one to "regularly suffer nightmares in
which he relives frightening experiences and awakens unable to breathe."
41. Id. at 878. In the United States, "our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). Despite the fact that the United
States Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the United
States Supreme Court "has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). A right appears to be considered con-
stitutional when it precludes "unwanted governmental intrusion into one's privacy."
Stanley v. Georgia, supra.
The makers of [the United States] Constitution undertook to se-
cure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his in-
tellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Ameri-
cans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
42. See Patient's Informed Consent, supra note 20, at 527.
1975
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III. INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO MENTAL PRIVACY
The machinery of the government should not be permitted
to tamper with the mental processes of the individual solely for
the purpose of furthering its political and ideological ends.43  The
government should not interfere with individual expression unless
it is an immediate and imminent threat to the very existence of
the state. 44  However, even the existence of such a threat fur-
nishes no justification for mind alteration by either surgical or non-
surgical procedures.4 5 The use of such techniques can never be a
permissible practice no matter how legitimate the ends.
43. The state's power to coerce individuals should be internationally cur-
tailed. The state is a greater threat than individuals.
Where the institution in question is the state, that power is tremendous.
That is why technicalities must free the criminal. History has proved
that we can survive criminals at large; we cannot survive the state at
large.
Jackson, Are All Laws Technicalities?, JuRis DOCTOR, Nov. 1974, at 16, 17. With-
out placing limits on a state's power, the population at large could conceivably be
controlled by governmental intimidation. Intrusions into the mental processes of a
state's nationals with drugs and surgical means place a chilling compulsion on de-
viants to become conformists. In view of the fact that psychosurgery has been
advocated for the control of domestic and international violence in the political
sphere, the danger of a massive use of psychosurgery is not an exaggeration. See
1973 Hearings, supra note 20, at 439. This is probably the reason that when it
met at Cambridge University in England, the Third International Congress on
Psychosurgery unequivocally, universally, and internationally condemned any use
of psychosurgery for political or social purposes. Cingulotomy Helps Some Pa-
tients, Surgeon Says, 225 J. AM. MED. AWS'N. 1036 (1973).
It is interesting to note that one group of neurosurgeons, the International
Association for Psychosurgery, is apparently in favor of psychosurgery. MEDICAL
OPINION, supra note 19, at 32.
44. The constitutional limitations on governmental interference with free
speech in the United States could form a workable basis for international guide-
lines. The following cases demonstrate the limitations that are placed upon the
United States government. In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1956), the
Supreme Court held that advocacy of abstract principles divorced from any effort
to instigate action to that end is not precluded by the Smith Act. This is true
even though such advocacy may be engaged in with evil intent. See also Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 493 (1951).
The government in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), attempted to
regulate the content of an individual's message by arresting him when he wore
a jacket that allegedly had vulgar words across its back. The intent of the ar-
resting parties was apparently to control the content of the message. The Court
stated:
We cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of un-
popular views.
id. at 26.
45. Despite his acts, the individual should be guaranteed the right to retain
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The United Nations appears to be in accord with this posi-
tion. One of the stated purposes of those establishing the United
Nations was to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person . ." Although
the United Nations has not unequivocally stated that one of its
purposes is to protect the mental integrity of the individual, it
seems evident that such a purpose is implicit in the above lan-
guage.
Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
more directly related to the mental integrity of the individual and
provides that:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social se-
curity and is entitled to realization, through national effort
and international cooperation and in accordance with the or-
ganization and resources of each State, of the economic, social
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality.47
The underlying theme of this provision is that there should be
both national and international cooperation to insure that the indi-
vidual's "personality" can freely develop. However, because it is
unclear whether the United Nations principles relating to hu-
man rights are pronouncements of enforceable rights or whether
they are mere statements of future goals,4 it is essential that the
United Nations position on the sanctity of a person's thought proc-
ess be unequivocal. By internationally codifying one's right to re-
main free of excessive human modification, the United Nations
could establish standards which preclude repression of social and
political dissidence in any manner which destroys a person's
mind.49
his overall personality. This inviolable right of man can serve as the only sure
foundation for a genuine and long-lasting system of international cooperation.
See San Diego Evening Tribune, Oct. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1. The U.N. General
Assembly has expressed its agreement with this position in part one of article 10
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This section states
that "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 54, U.N. Doe. A/6546 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Inter-
national Covenant].
46. See U.N. ClARtT, preamble.
47. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 22, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/810 at 75 (1948) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of
Human Rights].
48. Guggenheim, Key Provisions of the New United Nations Rules Dealing
with Human Rights Petitions, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 427, 437 (1973).
49. By "destroy" the author is referring to the physical destruction of the
12
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"Mental freedom" is the antecedent to the autonomous exer-
cise of any rights relating to communication.5 If a person loses
the capacity to generate thought, ideas and mental activity-the
freedom of mentation-the freedom of expression becomes
meaningless.51
Thought cannot be seen, and therefore it cannot be directly
judged or coerced. Despots can compel men's bodies, but
their hold upon minds is indirect and uncertain.
To describe Socrates in gaol as a free-minded man with-
out liberty does not mean that he had lost the natural creative
power of his mind; that power remained, and it has worked
among humanity for more than two thousand years. It is
only a way of saying that the freedom of Socrates' mind was
beyond the power of the Athenian state which imprisoned
and destroyed his body.
52
Thus, even though a person might be denied physical liberty,
the creative power of the mind can still exist and be safeguarded.
The mentality of a person is the determining factor of
his behavior, personality, and identity.53  Hence permanent thera-
peutic changes in an individual's mental processes permit manipu-
lation of the very essence of human existence as it is known.
Without formulation and recognition of a protectable right to
"mental privacy",54 establishment of other human rights may be
in vain.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is presently the
most useful and convenient tool in which to incorporate the com-
ponents that make up the right to "mental privacy".55 Mental pri-
mind or any part thereof. See generally Chorover, Psychosurgery: A Neuropsy-
chological Perspective, 54 BosToN U.L. REv. 231 (1974).
50. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and
the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 So. CALIF. L. REv. 237, 255-276 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Shapiro]. See also Gobert, supra note 27, at 187.
51. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 258-261. See also Kaimowitz v. Dep't Mental
Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10,
1973), in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973). In Kaimowitz the court also noted
the necessary connection between mentation and communication.
52. POWER IN MEN, supra note 1, at 17.
53. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 275. See generally Public Health Service, note
21, supra.
54. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 275. The concept of mental privacy is in-
tended to serve as a bar to governmental intrusions into the mental processes for
the purpose of altering or destroying the integrity of the mind. The concept is
intended to preclude only those governmental intrusions solely designed to repress
social or political dissidence and which are not consented to by the subject.
55. Presently the U.N. human rights clauses do not set forth standards that
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vacy could be interpreted as being the first expressed component
of an international right to privacy.5 6 Recent action taken by the
United Nations demonstrates that there has already been interna-
tional recognition of a right to privacy.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights contain provisions
that illustrate this recognition.5  Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
58
The language of article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and 'Political Rights is similar to the above article. The pro-
visions of article 12 are subject to limitations in article 29 of the
Universal Declaration, which reads in part as follows:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general wel-
fare in a democratic society.59
Thus, article 29 of the Universal Declaration best exemplifies the
United Nations recognition that the scope of the right of privacy
must not be such that it threatens the welfare of others.60
can be used as guides for determining whether a particular human rights provision
has been violated. Precise interpretation of the particular human rights and fun-
damental rights that a certain provision represents could serve as a guide to a State
in its domestic behavior. See generally Schluter, The Domestic Status of the Hu-
man Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 110 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Schluter].
56. "If the right to privacy is to be at all meaningful, it must necessarily
include the right to bodily inviolability and the right to one's personality." Go-
bert, supra note 27, at 191.
57. Declaration of Human Rights, note 47, supra; International Covenant,
supra note 45, at 49, 52.
58. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47, at 73-74.
59. Id., art. 29(2), at 77.
60. Id. Article 30 of the Universal Declaration seems to suggest that a per-
son should not be allowed to act in a manner that may curtail the rights of other
nationals. This article in relevant part provides that:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any ...
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed
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While the Universal Declaration lacks the legal force of an
international treaty:
[T]he very existence of an internationally-recognized right to
privacy presupposes agreement that there are certain areas of
the individual's life that are outside the concern of either gov-
ernmental authorities or the general public, areas which may
vary in size from country to country but which do possess a
common central core.6 '
The clause in article 12, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy" could be construed to include "mental
privacy" as a component. All the United Nations need do is give
this provision lasting legal effect. Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration could be the safeguard that guarantees "mental priva-
cy" as an international freedom. 62
IV. PUBLICITY AS A MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THE
INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The establishment of an international right to privacy by the
U.N. will have little effect unless it is safeguarded by an interna-
tional body. In the past, the notion of domestic jurisdiction"3
was the major obstacle to international protection of human rights.
The principle of domestic jurisdiction is set forth in article 2(7)
of the United Nations Charter which provides that:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter .... 64
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth [in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47, at 77.
61. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1116 at 13 (1948).
62. The United Nations' recognition of the right to mental privacy appears
to be demonstrated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is stated
that " everyone has the right to freedom of thought [and] conscience.... ".Dec-
laration of Human Rights, art. 18, note 47, supra.
63. The principle of domestic jurisdiction is that the state shall be
master in its own house. Jurisdiction is the competence to prescribe and
enforce rules of law governing persons and things. . . . Jurisdiction in
great part denotes both state power and national territory, and it is called
domestic, with strong evocation of house and home, where it covers mat-
ters of peculiar national concern, to be reserved to the state to the exclu-
sion of all foreign influence or intervention.
Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTs 286 (E. Luard ed. 1967).
64. U.N. Charter, art. 2(7).
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Despite the language of article 2(7), which expressly establishes
the exclusive jurisdiction of individual states over matters of na-
tional concern, customary law has changed regarding the content
of what is considered to be within the domain of the domestic ju-
risdiction of a nation.65 As one authority has stated:
[I]t appears that the universal attention devoted to the way
in which people are treated in their own country, and the
practice of the United Nations in this field, must clearly be
interpreted as indicating that human rights have finally been
removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of states and lifted
up into the realm of international concern. As a conse-
quence, human rights have been placed outside the reach of
the Article 2(7) intervention ban, even in cases not amount-
ing to a threat to the peace.66
This view is supported by United Nations application of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention to situations where grave
breaches of human rights have occurred.6 7  However, because of
the quantitative prerequisite to the invocation of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, this doctrine is inapplicable as a means
to safeguard "mental privacy."68
Governments need not alter the mental processes of every-
one in order to exert control over an entire population. Such
treatment directed at a small number of key persons can be suffi-
cient to achieve this desired effect. 69 Since this method of control
will probably not justify the use of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, "mental privacy" must therefore be protected on a
qualitative rather than a quantitative basis.
The most effective way to safeguard "mental privacy" is
through the power of public or world opinion. Although neither
65. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L
L. J. 203, 241 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fonteyne].
66. Id. at 241.
67. Id. at 260.
68. The U.N. seems reluctant to intervene into state matters for humanitar-
ian motives until there is in fact the threat of widespread human rights violations
evolving into actual "mass deprivation." Id. However, if the right being violated
is in fact a human right, then the right itself does not become more sacred merely
because there is a greater number of persons whose same human right is being
violated.
69. It has been contended that electrodes do not have to be placed in the
brains of everyone for control to be exerted over an entire population. After a
few key people are so treated the rest of the population will be intimidated. See
1973 Hearings, supra note 20, at 381.
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the United States nor the Soviet Union need fear military sanctions
of less powerful nations, both nations attach the greatest impor-
tance to opportunities offered by membership in the United Na-
tions where each can present its position and exert influence upon
world opinion. 70  The use of public opinion seems to be the most
realistic way of insuring that an international right to privacy be
safeguarded in powerful nations of the world community.
The power of publicity to aid the oppressed is a practice
which has been fervently urged in the past in United Nations pro-
ceedings.7' The rationale for such publicity is that exposure of
injustices or deprivations of human rights could alleviate such con-
ditions. 72  The United Nations has used public opinion in its at-
tempt to force South Africa to abandon apartheid. The United
Nations Secretary-General was requested by the United Nations
Human Rights Commission:
[T]o give the widest possible publicity, as soon as possible, to
the documents . . . containing the testimony of political pris-
oners, victims of torture and ill-treatment in the prisons of
South Africa. . . .73
Additionally, the Commission called upon the member states to
publicize, through all available media, the substance of these
documents.7 1 In 1967, the General Assembly:
[I]nvited all States to encourage the establishment of na-
tional organizations for the purpose of further enlightening
public opinion on the evils of apartheid and requested the
Special Committee on Apartheid to report on measures which
might appropriately be taken to ensure the widest dissemina-
tion of information on the evils of apartheid and the efforts of
the international community to secure its elimination. .... 75
The United Nations Human Rights organizations have not
confined their use of publicity to dissemination of information re-
garding the anti-apartheid struggle. For instance, after the Eco-
nomic and Social Council requested wide circulation of a report
70. Friedman, National Sovereignty, International Cooperation, and the Re-
ality of International Law, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 739, 749 (1963).
71. See J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 154
(1970) [hereinafter cited as U.N. PROTECTION].
72. Id.
73. Id. at 155.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 157,
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on slavery, the appeal was met with a number of newspaper
stories.76
The actual effectiveness of publicity in protecting basic rights,
of course, cannot be determined. Only the opinions of those
experts with U.N. experience can be called on as evidence.
In the absence of other assuredly productive procedures, pub-
licity at least is worth trying for whatever results it achieves.
The mere satisfaction of those aggrieved, on seeing their op-
pressions widely broadcast, would suffice for justification
even if it could be proved that the experienced persons cited
are wrong when they say that sovereigns do care about public
opinion. 77
If the public is made fully aware of its rights, it may be able to
initiate change even in societies which utilize repressive mecha-
nisms to control the population.
V. CONCLUSION
Rather than continuing to serve as an international body that
promulgates documents on human rights without deeming which
"rights" may be a basis for a claimed violation, the United Nations
should formulate and adopt an international right of mental pri-
vacy.78 Such a "right" seems fundamental to the autonomous ex-
ercise of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights.
79
The concept of "mental privacy" could preclude governmen-
tal intrusions into mental processes when the sole purpose of the
state is to further its own ends by repressing social or political dis-
sidence.A0 By allowing the freedom of the individual to become
76. Id. See also J. CAREY, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
13 (1968).
77. U.N. PROTECTION, supra note 71, at 158. See also J. CAREY, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTs 13-15 (1968).
78. The human rights provision in article 12 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which provides "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interfer-
ence with his privacy," constitutes nothing more than an abstract regulation that
is general in content. The standards which this clause is supposed to contain
should include the component of mental privacy. In this manner, states could
be given fair notice of how they are expected to behave. See generally Gobert,
supra note 27.
79. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47, arts 2, 8.
80. This international right to mental privacy does not have to be worded
in a manner that absolutely precludes nationals from waiving the international en-
forcement thereof. By establishing international guidelines for scrutinizing any
such waiver, coercive forces that may have influenced an individual's decision can
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subordinated to the general welfare of the state, the United Na-
tions seems to be abandoning its concern for the personal integrity
of individuals.
In order to insure to future man greater personal freedom,
the United Nations must adhere strictly to the provisions of the
Declaration of Human Rights. By safeguarding this right, the re-
alization of other human rights becomes possible.81  Having en-
acted many provisions guaranteeing individuals' basic rights, the
United Nations should not shrink from its duty to guarantee each
person's mental integrity.
Garland E. Burrell, Jr.
be detected and eliminated. For a summary of some international opinions on the
ethics of, and indications for psychosurgical intervention, see Cingulotomy Helps
Some Patients, Surgeon Says, 225 J. AM. M. Ass'N 1036, 1037 (1973).
81. The human being is a functional trinity of sensory inputs and be-
havioral responses connected by the essential link of intracerebral proc-
esses. The three aspects are equally essential ...
J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND TOWARD A PSYCHOCIVILIZED SOCI-
ETY 244 (1969). In view of the fact that both psychosurgery and psychotherapeu-
tic drugs alter the functional trinity which constitutes the human being, it seems
evident that such intrusions into the mental processes are in fact changing the
"essence of man." See MENTAL HYGIENE, note 24, supra.
Vol. 6
19
Burrell: Mental Privacy: An International Safeguard to Governmental Intrus
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975
